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Recent school shootings, such as those in Santa Fe, Texas, and 
Parkland, Florida, have intensified the long-standing national debate 
surrounding gun policy.1 The debate centers around what one side 
 
 *  © 2018 Aaron D. Davison. 
 1. See, e.g., Callum Borchers, Texas Shooting Suspect’s Choice of Guns Complicates 
Debate over Assault Rifles, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/nationworld/ct-texas-school-shooting-gun-debate-20180520-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5DE-2K7S (staff-uploaded archive)] (quoting an opponent of gun 
control measures who believes that the shotgun used by the Santa Fe High School shooter 
“is actually more deadly than the much-vilified AR-15” and that “[b]anning AR-15s will 
do nothing to stop disturbed and deranged shooters”); Emily Witt, How the Survivors of 
Parkland Began the Never Again Movement, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-survivors-of-parkland-began-the-never-
again-movement [http://perma.cc/KRS8-CAJ5] (explaining that only four days after the 
shooting in Parkland, Florida, students began advocating for stricter background checks 
through news interviews, op-eds, and the formation of the Never Again movement). 
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sees as a necessary remedy to unacceptable gun violence across the 
country and the other side perceives as the categorical abridgment 
and eventual confiscation of a fundamental constitutional right.2 
Commentators have criticized both viewpoints3 as being 
counterproductive due to their ardent, all-or-nothing arguments.4 If 
continued, one commentator argues, it will impede future attempts to 
attain bipartisan compromise for gun policy.5 
Despite the ideological gridlock, our nation’s gun laws have 
changed substantially in the last fifty years. All fifty states now permit 
concealed carry6 and forty-five states allow open carry of a gun, 
though some are more restrictive than others.7 Of the forty-five states 
 
 2. Eric Arnesen, ‘Gunfight: The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms in America’ by 
Adam Winkler, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 3, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/books/ct-
books-gunfight-review-story.html [https://perma.cc/JZ42-TGB2 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 3. Justin Bank, Right and Left React to the Las Vegas Shooting and the Gun Control 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/us/politics/right-
and-left-las-vegas-shooting-gun-control-debate.html [https://perma.cc/66Y4-9X22 (dark 
archive)] (chronicling the debate following the Las Vegas shooting); James Brooke, 
Shootings Firm Up Gun Control Cause, at Least for Present, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at 
A1 (chronicling the debate following the Columbine shooting); Mariano Castillo, NRA 
Clear on Gun Debate Stance: Arm Schools, CNN (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/
2012/12/21/us/connecticut-school-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZK4J-CJBA] 
(chronicling the debate following the Sandy Hook shooting); Anna Dubenko, Right and 
Left React to the Gun Control Debate After the Florida Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/politics/right-and-left-react-to-the-gun-control-
debate-after-the-florida-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/6D7W-A2GW (dark archive)] 
(chronicling the debate following the Parkland shooting); Michael D. Regan, San 
Bernardino Shooting Sparks Fresh Debate Over Gun Laws, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 5, 
2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/san-bernardino-shooting-sparks-fresh-debate-over-
gun-laws [https://perma.cc/8UDA-6YZ7] (chronicling the debate following the San 
Bernardino shooting); Laurel Wamsley, A Texas Town Mourns, and a Nation Struggles to 
Find New Ground in Gun Debate, NPR (May 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2018/05/21/613006381/a-texas-town-mourns-and-a-nation-struggles-to-find-new-
ground-in-gun-debate [https://perma.cc/TLR9-S935 (dark archive)] (chronicling the debate 
following a shooting in Santa Fe, New Mexico). 
 4. Arnesen, supra note 2. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/#state 
[https://perma.cc/PSE7-UFNJ]. 
 7. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 17 
(2015) (discussing the proliferation of concealed carry permits in Florida and the nation at 
large); Joshua Gillin, There Are 45 States that Allow Open Carry for Firearms, Former 
NRA President Says, POLITIFACT FLA. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.politifact.com/
florida/statements/2015/nov/18/marion-hammer/there-are-45-states-allow-open-carry-handguns-
form/ [https://perma.cc/9E6X-GQUX] (analyzing the NRA president’s statement regarding 
open carry laws across the United States and concluding that groups on both sides of the 
aisle on gun policy agree that five states ban open carry, although the open carry laws in 
97 N.C. L. REV. 192 (2018) 
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that allow open carry, thirty-one allow it without a permit or license.8 
Moreover, by 2010, District of Columbia v. Heller9 and McDonald v. 
City of Chicago10 had fundamentally changed the scope of Second 
Amendment rights.11 While the impetus behind this change is unclear, 
one thing is evident: there has been an underlying evolution in the 
way our nation views guns, which has impacted the pervasiveness of 
concealed and open carry laws and the development of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.12 
What many Americans fail to recognize is that this change is 
more than simply a benefit or detriment to either side’s view of the 
national gun debate.13 Specifically, this change turns the foundation of 
 
some states are not as permissive as others). In fact, Professor Bellin also notes that 
“almost every state enacted at least one new gun law” after the Sandy Hook shooting, but, 
surprisingly, most of the new laws expanded gun rights. Bellin, supra, at 3. 
 8. Open Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/open-carry/ [https://perma.cc/
4U6W-CP8K]; see also Neena Satija, Texas a Flashpoint in National Debate over Right to 
Film Police, TEX. TRIB. (May 9, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/09/reveal-story-
1/ [https://perma.cc/H462-9A4Y] (describing groups that seek to hold police accountable, 
specifically highlighting members of a North Texas group called “Open Carry Cop Watch” 
that brings cameras and legally carries AK-47 and AR-15 rifles when monitoring the 
police). 
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 11. See id. at 791 (furthering the scope of Heller by concluding that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense applies to the states by incorporation into 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and that the 
respective statute in the District of Columbia was unconstitutional in banning the 
possession of handguns in the home). 
 12. See Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court Has Strengthened Gun Rights and Limited 
Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/06/
15/can-gun-control-still-pass-muster-in-the-supreme-court/the-supreme-court-has-strengthened-
gun-rights-and-limited-gun-control [https://perma.cc/6VWJ-5S78] (identifying Hillary Clinton 
and then-Senator Barack Obama as politicians who acknowledged the power of the 
Second Amendment and the rights it confers to individuals); see supra notes 6–11 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson (Robinson II), 846 F.3d 694, 707 (4th Cir. 
2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“Today in West Virginia, citizens are legally 
entitled to arm themselves in public and there is no reason to think that a person carrying 
or concealing a weapon during a traffic stop—conduct fully sanctioned by state law—is 
anything but a law-abiding citizen who poses no threat to the authorities.”), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.); Bellin, supra note 7, at 2–6 (discussing the substantial 
transformation of the nation’s gun laws and how this transformation changes the 
underpinnings of gun policing, specifically through the Fourth Amendment); Matthew J. 
Wilkins, Note, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of Firearms in Terry 
Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1165–67 (2017) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
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stop-and-frisk tactics on its head.14 As the police and the courts are 
faced with changing norms and sentiments surrounding guns, strict 
adherence to rigid, antiquated rules—whether perceived or actual—
results in perverse outcomes. Indeed, this was the issue in United 
States v. Robinson.15 
In Robinson II,16 the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s use of “armed and thus dangerous” to create a unitary 
concept because “[t]he use of ‘and thus’ recognizes that the risk of 
danger is created simply because the person, who was forcibly 
stopped, is armed.”17 In other words, law enforcement need not 
identify how an individual is dangerous outside of simply carrying a 
weapon18: under the “‘thus’ iteration,” the weapon alone makes the 
individual dangerous. 
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted this 
standard and effectively dismantled the basis of Terry frisks. 
Permissive carry laws are ubiquitous, and many law-abiding citizens 
freely participate.19 Now more than ever, the Fourth Circuit should 
have held that the “armed and dangerous” standard is comprised of 
two distinct inquiries that each require police to identify specific and 
articulable facts before frisking an individual. The Fourth Circuit’s 
unitary concept categorically disregards the evolution of 
constitutional rights, permissive gun-related state laws, and, most 
importantly, stop-and-frisk precedent, thereby subjecting both lawful 
gun carriers and those merely suspected of being armed to unbridled 
police discretion to stop-and-frisk.20 
 
Second Amendment jurisprudence and the deregulation of state firearm laws have 
“profoundly affected Fourth Amendment law,” specifically stop-and-frisk). 
 14. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining that “for many 
years” law enforcement could rightfully “assume that anyone carrying a concealed firearm 
was up to no good,” and, in fact, the act of carrying a concealed gun was branded as a 
“hallmark[] of criminal activity”); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1167 (explaining that “[i]n the 
past, there was a ‘blanket assumption’ that those who carried firearms were dangerous,” 
but this consensus has somewhat faded). 
 15. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.); 
see id. at 702 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 16. Throughout this Comment, Robinson II refers to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ en banc decision, not to the 2016 decision that vacated Robinson’s conviction. 
 17. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 700 (first citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968); and 
then citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (per curiam)). 
 18. See id. (“[T]he risk of danger is created simply because the person, who was 
forcibly stopped, is armed.”). 
 19. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Sections II.A–II.B.1. 
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Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the inception 
of stop-and-frisk and explains the procedural history, facts, and 
reasoning behind the majority and concurring opinions in Robinson 
II. Part II analyzes how the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the armed 
and dangerous standard and dismantled the basis of Terry frisks. It 
then discusses how the inevitable implications of the unitary concept 
will adversely affect lawful gun carriers and those assumed to be 
armed. Part III concludes that the Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari in a stop-and-frisk case, overturn the Fourth Circuit’s 
unitary concept holding, and clarify the importance of a separate 
showing of dangerousness in the frisk standard. 
I.  FROM TERRY TO ROBINSON 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from 
engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures “but upon probable 
cause.”21 Stop-and-frisk is a revolutionary concept in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence because it “cracked” the monolith of the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard.22 In Terry v. Ohio,23 
the Supreme Court held that a police officer can stop and frisk an 
individual based upon reasonable suspicion.24 One of the primary 
justifications for adjudicating the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk 
was the need for law enforcement to pursue investigations without 
fear of assault by an armed individual.25 
Like any new concept or practice, the Court set limiting 
parameters and standards: (1) an officer may conduct a stop only if 
they have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; and 
(2) after conducting a stop, the officer may conduct a frisk of the 
stopped individual only if there are specific and articulable facts that 
show the person is armed and dangerous.26 Additionally, the Court 
limited the scope of the frisk to a search for weapons in an 
individual’s outer layer of clothing.27 While the stop-and-frisk 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATING CRIME, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PERSPECTIVES 388–89 (6th ed. 2017). 
 23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 24. Id. at 27, 30–31. 
 25. Id. at 29; Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.). 
 26. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009). 
 27. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31. 
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doctrine has its proponents and detractors,28 it is an established arm 
of the Fourth Amendment.29 The Supreme Court’s limiting standards 
still stand to this day, but the frisk standard—more precisely, the 
internal “dangerous” inquiry—is under attack. 
In 2017, the majority in Robinson II held that “armed and 
dangerous” is a unitary concept, thereby broadening the divide in the 
already existing circuit split. This Part sets forth the facts and 
procedural history of Robinson II, presents the reasoning of the 
majority opinion, and summarizes the concurring opinion. The dissent 
is analyzed at length in Parts II and III. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
On March 24, 2014, in Ranson, West Virginia, an unidentified 
caller alerted the police that he “witnessed a black male in a bluish 
greenish Toyota Camry load a firearm [and] conceal it in his pocket” 
at a 7-Eleven convenience store.30 According to the testimony of 
several officers, the 7-Eleven is located in a quintessential high-crime 
area.31 Once the responding officer observed a blue-green Toyota 
Camry with a black, male passenger driving away from the 7-Eleven, 
he stopped the vehicle on the basis that both occupants were not 
wearing their seatbelts.32 
After approaching the car and asking for identification, the 
officer asked Shaquille Robinson to step out of the car.33 As 
Robinson exited the car, the officer “asked if [Robinson] had any 
weapons on him.”34 According to the questioning officer, Robinson 
 
 28. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957 (1999) (arguing that Terry v. Ohio was the 
catalyst for curbing Fourth Amendment protections for racially motivated searches and 
seizures); David A. Graham, Stop-and-Frisk: Trump’s Bad Idea for Fighting Crime, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-stop-
and-frisk-ineffective-unconstitutional/501041/ [https://perma.cc/5P6H-3L2K]; Thomas A. 
Reppetto, Opinion, How Stop-and-Frisk Saved New York, N.Y. POST (July 24, 2012), 
https://nypost.com/2012/07/24/how-stop-and-frisk-saved-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/Q2CZ-A6W5]. 
 29. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26–27. 
 30. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 696. 
 31. One officer, with only a year and a half of law enforcement experience, stated that 
he had experienced at least twenty drug trafficking incidents at this location. Id. Another 
observed three people waiting for drugs while she was dropping off an informant to buy 
drugs and received numerous complaints about drug transactions at this location. Id. 
Lastly, “[a]nother officer testified that ‘anytime you hear Apple Tree or 7-Eleven, your 
radar goes up a notch.’” See id. (alteration in original). 
 32. Id. at 697. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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said nothing but gave “a weird .	.	. ‘oh, crap’ look[].”35 The officer 
understood this look to mean, “I don’t want to lie to you, but I’m not 
going to tell you anything [either].”36 Thereafter, Robinson was 
instructed to submit to a frisk in which the officer recovered a loaded 
gun from his front pocket, confirming the prior tip.37 “According to 
officers’ testimony, Robinson was cooperative .	.	. and made no 
furtive gestures or movements” that suggested that he was reaching 
for the weapon during the stop.38 As a previously convicted felon, 
Robinson was charged with illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.39 
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant 
Robinson’s motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition seized 
during the frisk as a Fourth Amendment violation based on 
insufficient evidence that he was both armed and also dangerous.40 
However, the motion was ultimately denied by the district court.41 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, 
vacating Robinson’s conviction and sentence.42 Almost two months 
after the court reversed Robinson’s conviction, however, the court 
granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc, thereby 
vacating the previous panel’s judgment and opinion.43 
B. Majority Opinion 
After addressing Robinson’s concessions,44 the majority focused 
on the crux of the appeal—how the court would interpret and apply 
the armed and dangerous inquiry.45 Robinson argued that although 
 
 35. Id. (alteration in original). 
 36. Id. (alteration in original). 
 37. Id. 
 38. United States v. Robinson (Robinson I), 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en 
banc, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. §	922(g)(1) (2012). 
 40. Robinson I, 814 F.3d at 205 (emphasis added). 
 41. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 697. The district court “concluded that the .	.	. caller’s 
eyewitness knowledge and the contemporaneous nature of the [call]” were sufficient to 
“contribute to the officer’s reasonable suspicion” that Robinson was armed and dangerous 
when taken together with the high-crime area and Robinson’s “weird look.” Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Judge Niemeyer, at the outset of his discussion, quickly addressed multiple 
concessions that Robinson made in his briefs and oral argument, which included: (1) the 
lawfulness of both the forced stop based on the seatbelt violations and the instruction to 
exit the car; (2) the caller’s tip was sufficiently reliable to support the officer’s actions; and 
(3) the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe that Robinson was armed. See 
id. at 697–98. 
 45. See id. at 698–702. 
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the armed element of the standard was clearly met, the police are 
required to identify independent, objective facts that indicate that he 
is also dangerous.46 In other words, armed and dangerous 
encompasses two distinct inquires, requiring that police point to 
specific and articulable facts for each element before frisking an 
individual.47 Robinson argued that West Virginia, through legislation, 
allows its residents to carry concealed firearms.48 Therefore, the 
caller’s tip that a man had a loaded and concealed weapon should 
have been a mere alert to “innocent behavior,” given the officer’s 
lack of knowledge as to whether Robinson possessed a license to 
carry.49 Further, Robinson highlighted that his behavior during the 
stop did not create a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness.50 
The Fourth Circuit rejected Robinson’s arguments.51 Based on 
the majority’s reading, Terry and its progeny hold that being armed 
satisfies the armed and thus dangerous standard, allowing an officer 
to lawfully frisk.52 Notwithstanding the term’s conjunctive form, the 
inclusion of the word “thus” deliberately linked “armed” and 
“dangerous” into a unitary concept.53 In support of this interpretation, 
the court pointed to “the general risk .	.	. inherent during .	.	. traffic 
stop[s],” as acknowledged by the Supreme Court.54 Coupling the 
general risk in traffic stops with an individual who is “‘armed with a 
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against’ the 
 
 46. Id. at 698. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §	61-7-4(a) (Westlaw through 2018 First Extraordinary 
Sess.). 
 49. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698. It is important to note that the specific and 
articulable facts that are used to obtain a reasonable belief of dangerousness can only 
come from what the officer knows at the time before the frisk occurs. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). Uncertainty as to whether Robinson lawfully possessed the gun in 
this concealed carry state supports Robinson’s argument that the officer lacked the 
foundation to lawfully frisk him. See United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 
2013) (discussing the “eviscerat[ion]” of the Fourth Amendment if possessing a firearm in 
an open carry state as the sole justification for an investigatory detention). 
 50. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698 (“[H]e was compliant, cooperative, [and] not 
displaying signs of nervousness.”); Robinson I, 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(highlighting that the arresting officers indicated that Robinson was cooperative and made 
no movements that might have suggested that he intended to reach for his weapon during 
the stop), rev’d en banc, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) 
(mem.). 
 51. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698. 
 52. Id. at 699–700 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28). 
 53. Id. at 700. 
 54. Id. at 699; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). 
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officer,”55 a responding “officer is ‘warranted in believing his safety 
.	.	. [is] in danger.’”56 Moreover, state law permitting open or 
concealed carry does not eliminate danger to the officer in a lawful 
stop.57 The court noted that the purpose of a frisk for weapons is not 
to find evidence of a crime but to allow the officer to investigate the 
grounds for the stop “without fear of violence.”58 Lawfully carried 
weapons present no less of a danger than ones that are unlawfully 
carried, especially when the individual’s propensities are unknown.59 
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the frisk was 
constitutional and affirmed the judgment of the district court.60 
C. Concurring Opinion 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Wynn agreed at the outset that 
Robinson’s concessions—that he was lawfully stopped and that the 
police reasonably suspected he was carrying a firearm—alone were 
enough for the police to lawfully conduct a frisk.61 He departed from 
the majority, however, in the means used to reach that conclusion.62 
Judge Wynn noted that the majority reduced the central inquiry to 
whether the frisk was justifiable based solely on the tip that he carried 
a loaded and concealed weapon.63 But this fails to address two crucial 
questions: “(1) whether individuals who carry firearms—lawfully or 
unlawfully—pose a categorical risk of danger to others and police 
officers, in particular, and (2) whether individuals who choose to 
carry firearms forego certain constitutional protections afforded to 
individuals who elect not to carry firearms.”64 The answer to both 
questions, Judge Wynn concluded, is yes.65 
Beginning with the first question, Judge Wynn disagreed that the 
armed and dangerous standard is unitary.66 First, from a purely 
grammatical standpoint, the use of the word “and” by the Supreme 
Court elicits the “long-standing principle that elements separated by a 
 
 55. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 699 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23). 
 56. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
 57. See id. at 700–01. 
 58. Id. at 701 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 701–02. 
 61. Id. at 702 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 703. 
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conjunctive should be interpreted as distinct requirements.”67 In fact, 
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits found this grammatical analysis 
persuasive when holding that the armed and dangerous standard 
encompasses two distinct elements.68  
Second, interpreting the standard as unitary will lead to adverse 
consequences for people merely engaged in harmless behavior.69 The 
definition of armed, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is 
“[e]quipped with a weapon.”70 Unlike the term “firearm,” “weapon” 
can be broadly interpreted. Indeed, Justice Brennan addressed the 
expansive definition of “weapon” by listing everyday objects that, 
although dangerous when used for a nefarious purpose, should not 
elicit reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk.71 Nevertheless, the 
unitary concept interpretation means that any item that fits the 
definition of a weapon can give rise to reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a frisk, even if the item is not being used as a weapon.72 
Third, Judge Wynn pointed out that the Supreme Court in 
Michigan v. Long73 expressly recognized “the independent role of 
‘dangerous[ness].’”74 But Judge Wynn’s argument did not overcome 
the “thus” iteration; instead, it actually begged the question of how to 
reconcile Long with the unitary concept.75 
Notwithstanding the three arguments above, Judge Wynn argued 
that his disagreement with the majority was not predicated on the 
unitary concept interpretation in and of itself but, more distinctly, on 
the contention that the standard is unitary for all weapons.76 Instead, 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“Clearly established law require[s] .	.	. evidence that Northrup may have been ‘armed and 
dangerous.’” (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1967))); United States v. Leo, 
792 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that a frisk, which is an exception to a warrantless 
search, is allowed when there is an “articulable suspicion” that the individual is “both 
armed and a danger”). 
 69. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 703 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. (quoting Armed, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). 
 71. See Wright v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1149 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(listing items that the legislature could not have contemplated as falling within the 
definition of a weapon (quoting State v. Lee, 457 A.2d 1184, 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1982) (Antell, J., dissenting), aff’d as modified, 475 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1984)). 
 72. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 73. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 74. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring) (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 
1049). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 704–05. 
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Terry and Pennsylvania v. Mimms77 conflated the standard only 
where “officers reasonably suspect[] that a detainee has a firearm or 
other inherently dangerous weapon.”78 From this premise, Judge 
Wynn highlighted that the Supreme Court, and the Second, Fourth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have previously accorded heightened 
attention to guns because of their inherent dangerousness.79 These 
prior decisions led Judge Wynn to conclude that firearms are 
inherently dangerous, and that those who carry them pose a risk of 
danger to law enforcement and the public.80 
This conclusion, however, begged the secondary question of 
whether those who choose to carry firearms forego other 
constitutional protections afforded to those who do not carry 
firearms.81 The answer, again, was yes.82 The inherent danger of 
choosing to carry a weapon necessarily impacts their exercise of other 
constitutional rights, the most germane of which is being frisked when 
lawfully stopped.83 
II.  HOW THE MAJORITY OPINION MISINTERPRETED THE ARMED 
AND DANGEROUS STANDARD AND OPENED THE DOOR TO 
PERVERSE IMPLICATIONS 
The crux of the majority’s decision falls on whether Robinson 
and the circumstances surrounding his arrest provided the officer with 
specific and articulable facts as to his dangerousness. As mentioned 
above, the majority held that the armed and dangerous standard is a 
unitary concept based on the Supreme Court’s inclusion of the word 
 
 77. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). 
 78. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 79. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (discussing a 
law that mandated owners of legal firearms to disassemble or trigger lock their weapon); 
McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986) (stating that a gun is “typically and 
characteristically dangerous”); United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 
2007) (stating that a loaded gun is “by any measure an inherently dangerous weapon”); 
Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the possession of a 
firearm increases the risk of danger by adding “an aspect of violence to otherwise 
nonviolent conduct”); Love v. Tippy, 133 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the 
threat to the safety of others that firearms pose due to their “inherently violent nature”); 
United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1997) (contrasting the regulation of 
financial structuring with the regulation of firearms which “are inherently dangerous 
devices”). 
 80. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 705 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 706. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
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“thus” in Terry and Mimms. Therefore, the officer was justified in 
conducting a frisk based solely on the reasonable belief that Robinson 
was armed.84 The concurrence admonished the majority’s holding as it 
pertained to its overbroad reach in applying to all weapons.85 Judge 
Wynn found the unitary concept acceptable only in its application to 
firearms.86 Despite the slight difference, the unitary concept, as 
articulated by both the majority and concurrence, is an 
unconstitutional and incorrect reading of Terry and its progeny. The 
Supreme Court created the armed and dangerous standard to 
encompass two distinct inquiries. By reading the “armed and thus 
dangerous” iterations in isolation, the majority misinterpreted the 
standard. 
A. Errors by the Majority 
In Terry, a police officer observed two men alternately walk up 
and down a sidewalk; each time the two men passed the same store 
window, they stopped and peered inside, then conferred with one 
another before repeating the routine.87 This sequence of events led 
the officer to conclude that the men were armed and preparing for “a 
stick up.”88 The officer eventually engaged the men and frisked them 
for weapons.89 The Supreme Court stated that the officer was justified 
in believing the two men were “armed and thus presented a threat [or 
danger] to the officer’s safety.”90 In Mimms, one of the first stop-and-
frisk cases after Terry, an officer conducted a traffic stop to issue a 
traffic summons for the driver’s expired license plate.91 Upon 
approaching the car, he noticed a bulge in the individual’s jacket.92 
Fearing that the bulge might have been a weapon, the officer 
immediately conducted a frisk.93 The Court held that “[t]he bulge in 
the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed 
 
 84. See id. at 700–02 (majority opinion). 
 85. See id. at 704–05 (Wynn, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 6–7. 
 90. Id. at 28. It is important to note, however, that the Court recognized that the 
officer predicated his suspicion on the belief that the men were “contemplating a daylight 
robbery—which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of 
weapons.” Id. 
 91. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (per curiam). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the 
officer.”94 
The “thus” iteration is the foundation of the unitary concept 
interpretation.95 The Robinson II majority concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s use of “thus” expresses a deliberate choice to 
combine the elements and recognize that an armed individual is 
inherently dangerous.96 But this misinterprets and misapplies 
Supreme Court precedent in several ways. 
1.  Ignoring Intentional Phrasing 
First, the Robinson II majority neglected to give significant 
meaning to the Supreme Court’s grammatical structure of armed and 
dangerous. Clearly, there was no context offered by the Supreme 
Court which reasonably warrants the belief that the “and” in “armed 
and dangerous” is to be interpreted other than in its ordinary sense as 
a conjunction,97 aside from the “thus” iterations mentioned in Terry 
and Mimms.98 In support of the Robinson II majority, the 
concurrence admitted that the “thus” iteration, at most, conflated the 
elements into a unitary concept, but only for firearms.99 
Concededly, the majority’s and concurrence’s reasoning is 
compelling when applied to the regular armed and dangerous 
iteration—the Supreme Court did not coincidentally use the “thus” 
iterations. But, if there must be emphasis on the different iterations of 
the standard, the majority dodged the fact that the standard has been 
written a third way throughout the Supreme Court’s stop-and-frisk 
 
 94. Id. at 112. 
 95. Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
379 (2017) (mem.). 
 96. Id. (first citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968); and then citing Mimms, 434 
U.S. at 112). 
 97. See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 58 (1930). Compare Meredith v. Pence, 984 
N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ind. 2013) (“The framers [sic] use of the conjunction ‘and’ [in the 
education clause of Indiana’s Constitution] plainly suggests that the phrases are separate 
and distinct.”), with Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 454 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
60(b)(5)) (analyzing Rule 60(b)(5)’s list of three disjunctive provisions for relief and 
concluding that the use of “or” makes it clear that each provision is independently 
sufficient to warrant relief). 
 98. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 700 (holding, albeit implicitly, that the addition of 
“thus” in the armed and dangerous standard eliminates the ordinary use of “and” as a 
conjunction separating two distinct elements). 
 99. Id. at 704 (Wynn, J., concurring) (explaining that reconciling the regular armed 
and dangerous standard and the “thus” iteration in this way ensures two distinct meanings 
and maintains the limitations on police that Terry first created). 
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precedent.100 “Armed and presently dangerous” is the next most 
notable alternative phrasing of the standard. In fact, the Court wrote 
“and presently” as the first iteration of armed and dangerous in 
Terry.101 Neither the elevated weight given by the majority to the 
“thus” standard nor the concurrence’s limitation of the unitary 
concept to firearms can be reconciled with the equally weighty armed 
and presently dangerous iteration. 
Breaking down the grammatical structure of the “and presently” 
iteration shows how contradictory it is to the unitary concept. The 
court used a conjunction to signify separation and distinction of the 
two elements.102 If being armed were enough or, as the Fourth Circuit 
contends, if being armed inherently embodied danger, the court could 
have used it alone rather than form a standard that encompasses 
meaningless surplusage.103 More to the point, the second element—
dangerous—is offset by a qualifier: “presently,” which serves as a 
temporal constraint. This suggests that only danger in the moment is 
sufficient to warrant reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk.104 
Therefore, the officer is justified in conducting a frisk only by 
 
 100. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327–28 (2009) (applying the armed and 
dangerous standard to a stop-and-frisk involving a suspected gang member); Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047–49 (1983) (using the “armed and dangerous” standard to justify 
the search of a vehicle when the police have reason to suspect that the individual is 
dangerous and possesses immediate access to a weapon); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 
92–93 (1979) (stating that an officer could not justify the frisking of a bystander while 
conducting a search warrant under the armed and dangerous standard); Mimms, 434 U.S. 
at 112 (1977) (referencing the standard as both armed and presently dangerous and later 
as “armed and thus pos[ing] a serious and present danger”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 146–48 (1972) (holding that a police officer was justified in his frisking of an 
individual based on a tip that said individual was carrying a firearm under the armed and 
dangerous standard); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (stating that an officer is 
justified in conducting a stop-and-frisk if he reasonably believes the individual is “armed 
and presently dangerous”). 
 101. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (concluding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny 
police some form of self-protective search power when an investigated individual is 
“armed and presently dangerous”). Additionally, stop-and-frisk cases subsequent to Terry 
regularly incorporate the “and presently” iteration of the standard. See, e.g., Ybarra, 444 
U.S. at 92–93; Sophie J. Hart & Dennis M. Martin, Essay, Judge Gorsuch and the Fourth 
Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 135–36 (2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/69-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-132.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZF-R27K] 
(stating that most courts adhere to the “armed and presently dangerous” standard from 
Terry). 
 102. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1221. 
 103. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting). 
 104. Since police rely on in-the-moment judgments to form a reasonable suspicion, it 
logically follows that police can only draw on their perceptions. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; 
Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 698. 
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pointing to specific and articulable facts that the stopped individual is 
not only carrying a weapon but is, at that moment, also dangerous.105 
Of course, the plain-language argument can be configured in 
support of the “thus” iteration, but this further proves my point: there 
is no viable reconciliation in favor of the “thus” standard that could 
not also go in favor of “presently,” and vice versa, if emphasis is put 
on grammatical structure. At bottom, the conflicting iterations are 
polar opposites that nullify each other, leaving just the regular armed 
and dangerous standard. The unitary concept holding was 
manufactured out of the two mere instances that the Supreme Court 
used the “thus” iteration—out of seven other times the standard was 
written a different way throughout Terry and Mimms106—in isolation 
and without surrounding context. 
2.  Reading the Standard in Isolation 
Extending the argument that the majority’s preferred iteration is 
nullified by the equally available “and presently” standard, the “thus” 
iteration’s support for a unitary concept fails for a second reason: the 
majority ignored the interpretations of the frisk standard in cases 
decided after Terry and Mimms. After Mimms—which applied Terry 
to automobile drivers in a roadside setting107—Michigan v. Long 
presented the question of whether officers could extend a protective 
frisk for weapons during a roadside stop to the individual’s car.108 In 
Long, the Court discussed how Terry’s scope has been narrowly 
expanded over time to several new factual situations.109 Each 
situation, the Court recognized, poses substantial risk and danger to 
law enforcement,110 just like in Terry.111 Notwithstanding the new 
factual situation in Long, the Court held, in part, that the inherent 
danger in roadside stops “compel[s] our conclusion that the search of 
 
 105. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
 106. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (per curiam) (articulating 
the stop-and-frisk standard without using “thus” once); Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25, 27, 30 
(stating the stop-and-frisk standard five times without using “thus”). 
 107. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. 
 108. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1983) (“We did not, however, 
expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area 
beyond the person.”). 
 109. See id. at 1047–48. 
 110. See id. (establishing that the holdings of Pennsylvania v. Mimms and Adams v. 
Williams were both based in part on the inherent danger in traffic stops). 
 111. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24 (discussing the immediate interest of law enforcement 
to be able to assure their safety against America’s long history of armed violence). 
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the passenger compartment .	.	. is permissible if the police officer 
possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts’ 
.	.	. that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 
control of weapons.”112 
 Ybarra v. Illinois113 presents another contradictory reading of the 
armed and dangerous standard that the majority avoided.114 Ybarra 
was an unfortunate bystander in the Aurora Tap Tavern during the 
execution of a search warrant.115 The search warrant specifically and 
particularly allowed the officers to search the tavern and the prime 
suspect, a bartender at the tavern.116 However, law enforcement 
conducted pat downs of every individual in the bar, including Ybarra 
on two separate occasions.117 During the first pat down, the officer felt 
a cigarette pack on Ybarra.118 It was not until Ybarra was frisked for 
the second time that the officer removed the cigarette pack and found 
heroin inside.119 
Analyzing the case, the Court quickly rejected the State’s 
contention that there was probable cause to search and remove the 
cigarette pack.120 In the alternative, the State argued that the first pat 
down was constitutionally permissible as a frisk for weapons under 
Terry.121 The Court also rejected this argument because the frisk “was 
simply not supported by a reasonable belief that [Ybarra] was armed 
and presently dangerous.”122 
Neither Long nor Ybarra dealt with firearms,123 which Judge 
Wynn’s concurrence suggests is the linchpin that rightfully allows 
 
 112. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (conveying 
two distinct elements that must be met for the stop-and-frisk to be legitimate). 
 113. 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
 114. See id. at 92–93. 
 115. Id. at 88. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 88–89. The officers announced that they would be conducting pat downs as a 
“cursory search for weapons.” Id. at 88. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 88–89. 
 120. Id. at 91 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62–63 (1968)) (“[Ybarra’s] mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, 
give rise to probable cause to search [him] .	.	. [A] search or seizure of a person must be 
supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.”). 
 121. Id. at 92. 
 122. Id. at 92–93. 
 123. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1983) (involving an officer who saw a 
knife on the defendant’s floorboard); Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88–89 (involving an officer who 
found heroin on the defendant). 
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conflating the frisk standard into a unitary concept.124 But Adams v. 
Williams125 defeats that argument. In Adams, decided between Terry 
and Mimms, the officer received a tip that a man was sitting in his car 
with heroin and a gun.126 The officer approached the car, situated in a 
high-crime area, tapped on the window, and asked the individual to 
open the door.127 Instead, the individual rolled down the window, at 
which point the officer reached into the car and removed the firearm 
from the individual’s waistband.128 The gun carrier was subsequently 
arrested for unlawful possession of a pistol.129 
The frisked individual contested the reliability of the tip and, 
most relevantly, argued that the officer’s actions were unreasonable 
under Terry.130 Interestingly, although the case involved a firearm, the 
majority never mentioned any iteration of the armed and dangerous 
standard that included “thus” or “therefore.”131 Instead, the Court 
used the “armed and presently dangerous” iteration.132 Moreover, the 
Court pointed to several specific and articulable facts known to the 
officer at the time that made the officer’s actions reasonable, without 
referencing the unitary concept.133 Therefore, even when a firearm is 
the product of a frisk, the Supreme Court did not apply the unitary 
concept. 
These cases show two things. First, every expansion of the stop-
and-frisk doctrine has retained the requirement that an officer 
reasonably believe that the individual is armed and also dangerous—a 
two-element test.134 Second, despite the concurrence’s insistence, 
conflating the frisk standard when an officer is dealing with a firearm 
 
 124. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Wynn, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.). 
 125. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 126. Id. at 144–45. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 145. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 146 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)) (listing the standard only 
twice and phrasing it as either armed and dangerous or armed and presently dangerous). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 147–48. 
 134. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (discussing the elements of 
armed and dangerous separately when determining whether the search of a vehicle was 
appropriate); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92–93 (1979) (addressing each element of the 
armed and dangerous standard distinctly); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 
(1977) (per curiam) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22) (stating that a limited pat down is 
reasonable when the officer reasonably concludes that the individual is armed and 
presently dangerous). 
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is invalid under Adams. Overall, the Robinson II majority plainly 
read the “thus” iteration in isolation and without any surrounding 
context, disregarding anything contrary to their preferred unitary 
concept interpretation. Terry and its progeny show that the 
conjunction in armed and dangerous was intentional and each 
element must be distinctly satisfied to conduct a lawful frisk. 
B. Implications of Robinson II 
As discussed above, the majority misinterpreted Terry and its 
progeny,135 which led the court to hold that an individual is 
presumptively dangerous when armed.136 Unfortunately, that is where 
the majority opinion ends, with no discussion about the implications 
of this landmark interpretation. Fortunately, both the concurring and 
dissenting opinions explore the implications of this new 
interpretation, providing a vivid picture of the potential 
consequences. I will expand on these implications and provide my 
own. 
The dissent’s premise is based in the pervasiveness of state 
legislation allowing concealed and open carry in our nation.137 Judge 
Harris even stated that: 
[F]or many years .	.	. concealed firearms were hallmarks of 
criminal activity .	.	. carried by law-breakers to facilitate their 
crimes. .	.	. But that is no longer the case .	.	. as behavior once 
the province of law-breakers becomes commonplace and a 
matter of legal right, we no longer may take for granted the 
same correlation between “armed” and “dangerous.”138 
What this means, then, is that law enforcement cannot view guns 
through the same lens as they did before. Even if Terry and Mimms 
are read as creating a unitary concept through the “thus” iterations, 
both law enforcement and the courts must be prepared to adapt their 
procedures to a nation where state laws permit open and concealed 
carry and federal case law supports the constitutional right to bear 
arms.139 If not, the following consequences may result. 
 
 135. See supra Section II.A. 
 136. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.). 
 137. See id. at 707–08 (Harris, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 707. 
 139. See id. at 707, 714 (discussing the proliferation of gun laws); see also United States 
v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and 
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1.  No Barrier to Unbridled Police Discretion 
The justification for adjudicating the constitutionality of stop-
and-frisk in Terry was to craft a “narrowly drawn authority to permit 
a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police 
officer.”140 That justification plainly recognizes that “police officers 
need discretion to perform their investigative duties” free from the 
fear of a weapon being used against them.141 As a result, the Court set 
up a two-pronged analysis in which a frisk seemingly enables police to 
reach their desired end point; that is, a pat down allows the officer to 
continue his investigation with protection from the use of a firearm 
against himself.142 Simply considering the syntax of “stop-and-frisk” 
and its real-world application, officers may not conduct a frisk 
without (1) satisfying the stop standard, and (2) satisfying the frisk 
standard.143 It is reasonable to conclude that this was the standard the 
Terry Court intended. 
Although a Fourth Amendment violation during the stop portion 
involves a fundamental abuse of the “privacy and security of 
individuals,”144 this abuse is compounded by the effects of a resulting 
frisk. To be sure, a frisk is a highly intrusive search, even though it 
does not reach the magnitude of a full-blown search.145 The Terry 
Court vividly described the intrusive nature of the procedure and 
concluded that it has the potential to embarrass and create 
“community resentment,” and therefore is “not to be undertaken 
lightly.”146 It follows, therefore, that everything preceding a frisk is 
 
concurring in the judgment) (discussing the need for law enforcement and courts to 
“evaluate [their] thinking” on Fourth Amendment issues in light of gun rights). 
 140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 141. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 
1). 
 142. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (concluding that, after a thorough evaluation of the 
countervailing arguments, “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a 
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer”—indicating clear 
emphasis on creating a new extension of the Fourth Amendment that allows a search for 
weapons). Relatedly, in explaining his agreement with the reasonable suspicion standard 
crafted by the majority, Justice Harlan stated that the prevailing question generated by 
stop-and-frisk cases, including Terry, is whether the “evidence produced by a frisk is 
admissible.” Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Because this is the 
prevailing question, he stated that the problem is the determination of “what makes a frisk 
reasonable.” Id. Justice Harlan is impliedly observing that the frisk and anything coming 
from it is the critical part of the doctrine. See id. 
 143. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009). 
 144. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 145. See id. at 16–17. 
 146. Id. at 17 n.14. 
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meant to constructively serve as a barrier—when the barriers are not 
sufficiently hurdled, the concluding frisk must be invalidated. But, 
with the Fourth Circuit’s implementation of the unitary concept, the 
“dangerous” inquiry is rendered obsolete. This leaves only the stop 
standard and whether an individual is armed, or simply reasonably 
believed to be armed, as the last barriers to a frisk.147 Several courts—
including the Fourth Circuit—and commentators believe these are 
the only true barriers to a frisk,148 but the Supreme Court has never 
held that knowledge that an individual is armed was sufficient, on its 
own, to effectuate a frisk.149 But neither the stop standard nor the 
armed requirement meaningfully serve as a hurdle without the 
“dangerous” inquiry; thus, there are essentially no barriers to 
unbridled police discretion to frisk. 
 
 147. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 712 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting) 
(reciting the government’s argument that the court “need not worry about these possible 
disproportionate effects because a Terry frisk may be conducted only after a stop on 
reasonable suspicion,” which prevents stops based on hunches), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 
(2017) (mem.). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 700 (majority opinion); United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 
491 (10th Cir. 2013); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1167. 
 149. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (explaining that the 
circumstances allow a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile if the officer 
reasonably believes that the suspect “is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 
control of weapons,” thus showing a clear demarcation between the armed and the 
dangerous elements); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92–93 (1979) (rejecting the State’s 
argument that the first frisk of Ybarra was permissible under Terry because the officer 
conducted the frisk without a reasonable belief that Ybarra was armed and presently 
dangerous, the predicate to conducting a frisk); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (concluding that the 
most important part of an officer’s ability to effectuate a reasonable search for weapons is 
not “absolute[] certain[ty] that the individual is armed” but whether the officer “belie[ves] 
that his safety or that of others [is] in danger”); see also Northrup v. City of Toledo Police 
Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that armed is separate and distinct 
from dangerous). Even in the time period alluded to by Judge Harris—several years after 
the inception of the stop-and-frisk doctrine when concealed firearms were hallmarks of 
criminal activity—there had to be further evidence to frisk, because armed was insufficient 
on its own. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 707–08 (Harris, J., dissenting). The officer in Terry, for 
example, used his extensive knowledge of the area and many years of experience, 
knowledge of the crimes perpetrated there, and his extended observation of the suspects 
to provide facts that met the reasonable belief that the suspects were planning a daylight 
robbery, which was the present danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6, 28. Nevertheless, courts 
have concluded that reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed can meet the 
standard to conduct a lawful stop, especially when carrying a firearm is illegal in the 
jurisdiction. See Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 483, 486–87 (holding as reasonable a stop-and-frisk 
where an officer observed a handgun in the waistband of the suspect’s pants in a state 
where concealed carry is illegal); Bellin, supra note 7, at 31 (“The weapon, once detected, 
is suspected contraband, and contraband can be seized upon detection.” (citing Minnesota 
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993))). 
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For the stop portion, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime or other infraction has been or is being committed.150 
Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard.151 In practice, and 
specifically in Robinson II, the objectivity of reasonable suspicion is 
easily evaded,152 devolving into a mere smokescreen of protection.153 
A police officer stopped Robinson because of a seatbelt violation, a 
lawful pretext,154 to further investigate a tip by an unidentified caller 
as to a concealed handgun.155 No Fourth Circuit judge found this 
segment of the case problematic, because the law surrounding 
pretextual stops is settled. Notably though, the police officer may be 
incorrect about the armed status of an individual and still satisfy the 
armed inquiry of the frisk standard once the stop is completed.156 
In light of state legislation allowing concealed and open carry 
and the expanding scope of Second Amendment rights,157 being 
armed is largely a lawful act that should no longer carry a negative 
connotation.158 But under the unitary concept, an individual merely 
suspected to be armed who has only committed a seatbelt violation, 
or any other minor infraction, is now subject to a “lawful” invasion of 
 
 150. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009). 
 151. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22 (explaining that a court assesses the reasonableness of a 
search and seizure based on the objective standard of what facts were available to the 
officer at the moment of the search or seizure); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the 
subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.” (quoting 
United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000))). 
 152. Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 712 (Harris, J., dissenting). 
 153. Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death 
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 146 (1996) (asserting that a police officer’s 
traffic violation stop can provide a lawful pretext to serve as a smokescreen to disguise the 
officer’s true motives). 
 154. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–12 (1996) (holding that the Court is 
unwilling to entertain challenges to the Fourth Amendment based on subjectivity or 
pretext, so long as the pretext is not predicated on an impermissible discriminatory basis). 
 155. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 695. 
 156. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1977) (per curiam); Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27. 
 157. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 
(2017) (mem.); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); see, e.g., N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	14-269 (2017) (authorizing concealed carry with a permit); VA. CODE ANN. 
§	18.2-287.4 (Supp. 2018) (restricting certain types of carry); W. VA. CODE ANN. §	61-7-4 
(Westlaw through 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.) (authorizing concealed carry with a 
permit). But see United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 483, 486–87 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(referencing the New Mexico criminal statute that made carrying a concealed firearm 
anywhere illegal). 
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his or her sanctity.159 With the elimination of “dangerous,” the stop 
standard and the armed inquiry prove to be no more than ineffective 
barriers of Fourth Amendment protection. 
Police now have unbridled discretion to intrude upon citizens 
availing themselves of his or her state’s permissive gun laws.160 
Moreover, citizens now have no recourse to compel a distinct showing 
of dangerousness.161 Even worse is the potential for law enforcement 
to disproportionately use this discretion in certain areas and against 
certain people.162 Before the unitary concept interpretation, stop-and-
frisk had already provoked a longstanding debate surrounding race, 
police violence, and harassment.163 It has been recognized that the 
racial implications of upholding the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk 
were squarely before the Terry Court, whether in the form of an 
amicus brief164 or the national incidents leading up to the disposition 
of the case.165 In fact, the Terry Court admitted that it had at least 
 
 159. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 712 (Harris, J., dissenting) (reasoning that police can 
target whomever they please for an exploratory frisk—whether or not they know the 
individual is armed—if they watch them long enough to spot a moving violation). 
 160. See Devon W. Carbado & L. Song Richardson, The Black Police: Policing our 
Own, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1979, 2016 (2018) (explaining that reasonable suspicion, even 
without the unitary concept interpretation, is a low bar that gives police “tremendous 
discretion with respect to deciding whom to subject to stop and frisks”). 
 161. See, e.g., Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 700 (“In this case, both requirements—a lawful 
stop and a reasonable suspicion that Robinson was armed—were satisfied, thus justifying 
[the officer’s] frisk under the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law.”); Rodriguez, 739 
F.3d at 491 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer “had no reason to believe 
he was dangerous” merely because he was armed—being armed justified the 
reasonableness of the frisk). It is noteworthy to add that Justice Harlan’s oft-cited 
statement that “the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic” after a reasonable 
stop has been conducted does not apply in Robinson II. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). This is because the aforementioned statement is part of a larger 
conditional statement—the right to an immediate and automatic frisk is only present “if 
the reason for the stop is .	.	. an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.” Id. This was 
not the case in Robinson II. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 697. 
 162. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d at 711–12 (Harris, J., dissenting). 
 163. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio’s 
Pathway to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1516 (2017) (listing several factors 
spanning from protestations by African American leaders and race riots to President 
Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that 
all converged to make it clear that the Supreme Court was going to handle a stop-and-frisk 
case in the sixties). 
 164. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund submitted an amicus brief in Terry, arguing 
that stop-and-frisk “power is employed by the police most frequently against the 
inhabitants of our inner cities, racial minorities and the underprivileged.” Id. at 1527–28. 
 165. See id. at 1528–30 (discussing events from the civil rights movement in years 
preceding Terry). 
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contemplated the racial implications of stop-and-frisk.166 Accordingly, 
law professor Devon Carbado has argued that Terry, for multiple 
reasons, “enables police violence against African Americans,” 
thereby making it a central part of the debate about race, police 
violence, and harassment from the 1960s to today.167 
Fast forward to 2013, and the prescient protestations of several 
advocacy groups before the disposition of Terry came to fruition just 
as they warned. In the groundbreaking case of Floyd v. City of New 
York,168 a federal court found that New York Police Department 
“officers [were] directed, sometimes expressly, to target certain 
defined groups for stops.”169 And more broadly, within the last six 
years at least, the multitude of black men and women killed by law 
enforcement has spurred the debate surrounding race, police 
violence, and harassment to new heights, resulting in an ever-present 
tension between communities of color and police.170 Combining the 
predictions of aggravated racial implications, evidence of 
discriminatory employment of stop-and-frisk, and the interrelated 
resurgence of tension between communities of color and police, the 
unitary concept interpretation only exacerbates the problem. 
Disproportionate and discriminatory application of frisks can flourish, 
with no recourse in compelling a distinct showing of dangerousness, 
because the unitary concept interpretation openly invites unbridled 
police discretion. 
 
 166. When describing the procedure for a frisk and the backlash against police that can 
result from it, the Court noted that the exclusionary rule—the prevailing and resulting 
remedy when deciding a Fourth Amendment case—cannot control whether a frisk can 
abate this tension. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15, 15 n.11, 17 n.14; Carbado, supra note 163, 
at 1532–33 (explaining Chief Justice Warren’s argument that the exclusionary rule, as a 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, is ill-equipped to deter alleged wholesale 
harassment by police against African Americans). 
 167. Carbado, supra note 163, at 1510, 1512 (emphasis added). 
 168. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 169. Id. at 660; see also Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-
frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/SD8L-CBSQ (dark-archive)] 
(“Judge Scheindlin found[] the stops overwhelmingly involved minority men because 
police commanders had come to see them as ‘the right people’ to stop.”). See Carbado, 
supra note 163, at 1537–40, for an in-depth discussion of the Floyd litigation and the 
NYPD’s employment of stop-and-frisk as a racial profiling prophylactic. 
 170. See Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of 
Black Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory.html#
2016 [http://perma.cc/7GGM-P8AE] (profiling the cases of black men and women who 
died after a police encounter). 
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2.  Dismantling Terry’s Narrow Scope Within the Fourth Amendment 
The unitary concept dismantles the narrow scope of the stop-
and-frisk doctrine.171 Terry represents the beginning sketches of a 
wholly new parameter to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme 
Court was aware of the magnitude that the newly-minted 
constitutional doctrine would carry172—the opinion signaled to lower 
courts and law enforcement the conduct that the Court approved as 
“comporting with constitutional guarantees,” as well as the conduct 
that would be sanctioned as impermissible for years to come.173 To 
that end, the Court attempted to carefully craft the doctrine as a 
narrow exception to both the probable cause standard and general 
adherence to the warrant requirement.174 After Terry, moreover, the 
Court sought to maintain the doctrine’s narrow scope while 
developing the doctrine through new factual situations.175 
 
 171. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 707 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the unitary concept because it is “a rule that .	.	. open[s] the door to the very 
abuses the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) 
(mem.); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Being a felon in 
possession of a firearm is not the default status. More importantly, where a state permits 
individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, cannot justify 
an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification would dismantle Fourth 
Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states.”). 
 172. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 127 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Cognizant that such intrusion had never before received 
constitutional imprimatur on less than probable cause .	.	. we reflected upon the magnitude 
of the departure we were endorsing.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1968) 
(recognizing the competing arguments in favor and against giving stop-and-frisk practices 
constitutional support as well as the magnitude of the liberties at issue in Fourth 
Amendment cases). 
 173. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. The Court further stated that as the doctrine is incorporated 
into the “judicial process of inclusion and exclusion” of evidentiary rulings, the way a 
court rules will have the effect of either legitimizing or delegitimizing the conduct. Id. 
Last, in the opening paragraph of Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, he stated that he 
was “constrained to fill in a few gaps .	.	. because what is said by this Court today will serve 
as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this 
important new field of law develops.” Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 174. See id. at 20 (majority opinion) (“Instead [of being subject to the warrant 
procedure or probable cause], the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the 
Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); 
see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208–10 (1979) (discussing the inception of 
the stop-and-frisk doctrine and how the Supreme Court established a “narrowly drawn” 
and “narrowly defined” doctrine in its departure from probable cause; as well as how the 
Court has “been careful to maintain [Terry’s] narrow scope” throughout subsequent 
cases); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (emphasizing the Court’s “narrow” view of 
Terry’s exception to the probable cause requirement). 
 175. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam). 
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Robinson II did not present a new fact pattern warranting the 
expansion or restriction of the doctrine.176 Instead, the fact pattern 
came on the cusp of a transition of norms surrounding handguns, 
which challenged the underpinnings of stop-and-frisk. In essence, 
Shaquille Robinson argued to reaffirm the logical conclusion of Terry 
and its progeny as it pertains to frisks: dangerous is distinct and 
separate from armed, and requires specific and articulable facts 
before a frisk can be conducted.177 In other words, the Robinson II 
majority faced the ancillary question of whether there is permissible 
conduct that falls in the category of armed but not dangerous. 
Indeed, this holding could have embraced the narrow reach of 
stop-and-frisk.178 However, the majority elected to interpret the frisk 
standard as a unitary concept. The dangerousness of roadside stops 
and, most importantly, firearms (although both are legitimate) 
outweighed the potential for unbridled police discretion to intrude 
upon citizens’ liberty and security.179 It follows, therefore, that the 
scope of the doctrine has expanded beyond what the Court originally 
intended. In fact, in his concurring opinion in Terry—lauded for its 
prescient insight on several matters that would encapsulate the future 
development of the doctrine180—Justice Harlan further clarified what 
makes a frisk reasonable under Fourth Amendment protections by 
“fill[ing] in a few gaps” in the majority opinion.181 Specifically, he 
made it clear that the constitutionality of the frisk did not rest on the 
officer’s authority to protect himself and others from dangerous 
weapons—that is, the fact that Terry and Chilton were carrying 
concealed guns was not the reason why the frisk was upheld.182 
Instead, the majority in Terry affirmed the frisk because of the 
officer’s right to frisk when “confronting a possibly hostile person.”183 
Thus, both Justice Harlan and the majority clearly contemplated the 
 
 176. See supra Section II.A.2, for a discussion of post-Terry cases that involved new 
factual situations but did not stray from Terry’s core tenets. 
 177. See supra Section II.A. 
 178. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck 
in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to 
permit a reasonable search .	.	.	.”). 
 179. See Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[A]n officer who 
makes a lawful traffic stop and who has a reasonable suspicion that one of the 
automobile’s occupants is armed may frisk that individual for the officer’s protection and 
the safety of everyone on the scene.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.). 
 180. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1177. 
 181. Terry, 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. at 31–32. 
 183. Id. at 32. 
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use of a frisk when a person is dangerous (i.e., hostile). Therefore, the 
elimination of a key inquiry in the frisk standard—the “dangerous” 
inquiry—dismantles the basis of Terry frisks. 
III.  THE SOLUTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT 
For the reasons discussed in Part II, the Robinson II unitary 
concept interpretation is a misinterpretation of stop-and-frisk 
precedent that invites unbridled police discretion to frisk, and 
ultimately dismantles the basis of Terry frisks. Surprisingly, the 
Fourth Circuit is not the only federal appellate court to interpret the 
frisk standard as a unitary concept.184 On the other hand, the Sixth 
and Seventh Circuits have rejected a unitary concept interpretation.185 
Though some scholars characterize circuit splits as trivial and 
overstated,186 others have reached the opposite conclusion, 
specifically in the Fourth Amendment context, based on the 
perceived need for uniformity (which fosters public faith and 
legitimacy in the Supreme Court) and the Court’s core responsibility 
to clarify the meaning of rights.187 
The Supreme Court should clarify whether the frisk standard is a 
unitary concept or encompasses two separate inquiries. The Supreme 
Court forever changed the national debate surrounding gun policy 
with Heller and McDonald.188 Although there is no indication of 
direct causation, those two cases might have been the impetus for the 
torrent of state legislation permitting concealed and open carry. The 
Court perhaps affected a shift in the public’s perception toward guns, 
which were once deemed presumptively dangerous but are now 
authorized by law.189 Therefore, the Court can no longer sit on its 
 
 184. See United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 491 (10th Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally Wilkins, supra note 13, for a 
discussion of why conflating the frisk standard into a unitary concept is the correct way for 
courts to read the armed and dangerous standard. 
 185. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 186. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1139–40 (2012). 
 187. Id. at 1173–74. 
 188. The Heller Decision and What It Means, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/the-second-amendment/the-supreme-court-
the-second-amendment/dc-v-heller/ [http://perma.cc/DLZ8-NYB9] (“[T]he ruling in Heller 
represented a dramatic reversal of the Court’s previous interpretation of the Second 
Amendment.”). 
 189. See Bellin, supra note 7, at 31 (explaining that meeting the dangerousness element 
in armed and dangerous by implying danger from a firearm is “hardly a foregone 
conclusion” because of Terry’s requirement of specific and articulable facts to justify a 
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hands while the basis of Terry frisk doctrine is dismantled and 
rendered inconclusive—it must act to remedy the apparent 
misinterpretation and inevitable implications of the unitary concept 
interpretation. 
The Court has already abdicated its role of clarification once by 
failing to grant certiorari for Robinson II.190 However, Robinson II 
may present facts—concealing a firearm in a high-crime area—that 
summarily disqualify certain Supreme Court Justices from reversing 
the unitary concept, no matter how contrary it is to Terry and its 
progeny. As much as invalidating unconstitutional conduct matters, 
so does presenting the Court with the right set of facts to do so. 
Preliminarily, the Justices must agree that dangerous is a 
separate, distinct, and necessary element of the frisk standard, but 
ultimately, they must also agree that the facts of the case in front of 
them allow them to safely recognize and rule that the person’s 
conduct falls in the category of armed but not dangerous. Robinson 
II’s facts would be a toss-up if not disqualifying. But what about an 
African American bank manager who lawfully owns and carries a 
firearm, who was stopped and frisked simply because he carried a gun 
and looked out of place in an affluent, predominantly white 
neighborhood; or a plain-clothes, off-duty police officer carrying his 
gun in a high crime area who is stopped and frisked when pulled over 
by a colleague? If we assume there is no hint of danger or hostility in 
either of the hypothetical examples, just like in Robinson II,191 the 
Court is put in a conundrum that should end clearly in favor of 
invalidating the unitary concept. 
To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court should take the 
next opportunity to grant certiorari in a Terry stop-and-frisk case. The 
solution lies in the reasoning of Judge Harris’s dissent192 and the clear 
 
frisk); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1169, 1170–71 (recognizing that before Heller, carrying a 
weapon could be presumed to be an unlawful act that could elicit a stop and came with a 
blanket assumption that the person was dangerous, allowing a frisk; however, the Heller 
decision changed whether being armed was presumptively unlawful and dangerous). 
 190. Robinson v. United States, 38 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.) (denying Robinson’s 
petition for writ of certiorari). 
 191. Robinson II, 846 F.3d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[H]e was compliant, 
cooperative, [and] not displaying signs of nervousness.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) 
(mem.); Robinson I, 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (highlighting that the arresting 
officers indicated that Robinson was cooperative and made no movements that might have 
suggested that he intended to reach for his weapon during the stop), rev’d en banc, 846 
F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (mem.). 
 192. See generally supra Section II.B, for a discussion of the Robinson II dissenters’ 
arguments and their relevance to past and future stop-and-frisk cases. 
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parameters of the frisk standard proclaimed by Terry and its 
progeny,193 alongside the right set of facts. Using the correct 
interpretation and application of Terry and its progeny and the 
evolution of gun norms through a nationwide shift in legislation, the 
Supreme Court has the tools to effectively reverse Robinson II and all 
cases with similar holdings. 
CONCLUSION 
The armed and dangerous standard is in need of repair after the 
Robinson II majority’s unitary concept interpretation. The assertion 
that being armed alone satisfies the frisk standard is a 
misinterpretation, contrary to Terry and its progeny’s clear separation 
and distinction between armed and dangerous.194 The consequences 
that will abound from this holding are lengthy and profound.195 The 
holding will forever brand those who avail themselves of permissive 
concealed or open carry state laws as the subjects of unbridled police 
discretion, and it doesn’t stop there.196 The Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari in a Terry frisk case involving a gun and give the 
lower courts clear guidance as to the unconstitutionality of a unitary 
concept interpretation and the importance of a separate showing of 
dangerousness in the frisk standard. 
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